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Misclassified and Unprotected: Survival Migration from Myanmar and the Limits of Thailand’s Pink Card System

On 25 August 2025 by SPP

Author: Htet Pwint Phyu

Advisor: Ora-orn Poocharoen

Abstract

This study analyzes Thailand’s Pink Card system critically in the context of Myanmar migration following the coup.  The Pink Card system, which was first created to legalize low-skilled migrant labor, is inadequately equipped to handle the increasing number of Myanmar migrants escaping armed conflict, political persecution, and state collapse following the military coup in 2021.  Based on field interviews conducted between April–May 2025 in Mae Sot, Mae-Kasa, Mae Wang, and Chiang Mai, the study shows a fundamental mismatch between the legal classifications enforced by Thailand’s registration system and the actual realities of migrants.  Misclassification of refugees as economic migrants forced deskilling, employer-dependent legal status, reliance on exploitative brokers, and gendered forms of insecurity constitute a handful of the key concerns. Using the theoretical frameworks of survival migration, structural exclusion, and legal precarity, the paper examines how the existing system increases rather than decreases migrant vulnerability. It argues for immediate policy reform, with two main recommendations—the establishment of a “Skilled Humanitarian Worker Permit” and the implementation of a “Training Visa Scheme” based on global best practices from Canada, Italy, and Germany.  While promoting Thailand’s social and economic development, these policies seek to acknowledge the varied abilities, requirements, and rights of Myanmar migrants.  The paper concludes by advocating for a more rights-based and inclusive migration framework that considers the complex realities of forced migration in Southeast Asia.

1. Introduction

Thailand’s Pink Card system is designed to manage and legalize the status of low-wage foreign laborers, primarily from neighboring countries. This system is part of Thailand’s efforts to control irregular migration and provide temporary legal status through limited labor rights (Hall, 2011; ILO, 2021). This system assumes that all migrants enter Thailand voluntarily for economic opportunity.

However, this assumption fails to reflect the post-2021 reality of Myanmar migration. Since the Myanmar military coup in 2021, the profile of migrants entering Thailand has changed. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), an estimated 1.5 million Myanmar nationals crossed into Thailand between January 2023 and February 2024, with long-term entries increasing by 50% in early 2024 compared to early 2023. Of these, 25% of long-term arrivals cited reasons related to conflict and discrimination—a striking shift from pre-coup trends—while 60% arrived without documentation, exposing them to higher risks of exploitation (IOM, 2024).

At the same time, data from the Department of Employment confirms that as of March 2024, 2.3 million Myanmar nationals were registered migrant workers in Thailand—70% of the country’s total migrant workforce. The vast majority were regularized through the Pink Card system, despite many having fled under crisis conditions not typically associated with economic migration (IOM, 2024). Many individuals—including teachers, students, and political dissidents—have fled to Thailand not in search of employment, but in search of safety and survival. Once in Thailand, many register under the labor-based Pink Card system despite not engaging in traditional employment. Some rely on online remote jobs, savings, or community support networks to survive, revealing a mismatch between their legal classification and actual livelihood strategies. The Pink Card system does not accommodate such survival migrants, leading to their misclassification, exclusion, and exploitation.

2. Methodology

​​This study uses a mixed-approaches strategy, integrating quantitative and qualitative data gathering methodologies to provide an in-depth understanding of the policy mismatch of Thailand’s Pink Card System. It also draws on field interviews conducted in April and May 2025 in Maekasa, Mae Sot, Mae Wang, and Chiang Mai. A total of 10 semi-structured interviews were conducted with Myanmar migrants, including both documented and undocumented individuals. Many interviewees self-identified as professionals or students prior to their migration and now they registered under the Pink Card system. To learn more about the organizational viewpoint on migration issues and the use of biometric data, in-depth interviews will also be conducted with representatives of important NGOs, such as International Detention Coalition (IDC), and advocacy groups for migrants. By combining the expert opinions of advocacy groups with the firsthand experiences of migrant workers, this combination of approaches offered an in-depth understanding of the topic. The interviews were analyzed thematically, with attention to the alignment or misalignment between their migration motivations and the assumptions embedded in Thailand’s Pink Card policy. This study tries to answer the questions of how Thailand reform its biometric registration and migrant documentation system to reflect the changing needs and legal categories of Myanmar migrants, including those fleeing conflict and insecurity, and what are the consequences of using Thailand’s Pink Card system to register Myanmar migrants who are not economic workers, and how can policy better align with migrants’ actual reasons for migration?

3. Thailand: Where Migrants Feel at Home or A Haven Amid Crisis

For many Myanmar migrants, Thailand is more than just a destination of economic opportunity—it is a place that feels like home. Amid civil war, collapsing infrastructure, and fear of persecution in Myanmar, Thailand offers a nearby sanctuary with cultural familiarity, relative safety, and access to basic needs. This powerful emotional connection—expressed by interviewees—adds depth to the structural push and pull factors that shape migration decisions.

3.1 Push Factors from Myanmar: A State of Insecurity and Displacement

Since the February 2021 military coup, Myanmar has descended into a state of chronic insecurity, marked by armed conflict, political repression, and humanitarian collapse, and these situations have made everyday life dangerous (OHCHR, 2023). Public infrastructure has deteriorated across the country. In many areas, access to electricity, healthcare, education, and safe drinking water is either unreliable or completely absent. The military’s implementation of a conscription law in early 2024 further intensified fears among youth, who face mandatory military service in a war they do not support (Myanmar Now, 2024). Additionally, the collapse of rule of law—where courts function under military control—means there is little to no legal recourse for protection against abuses. These conditions have produced widespread displacement: as of early 2024, the UNHCR reported that over 2.6 million people are internally displaced in Myanmar, with many crossing borders to escape persecution and hardship (UNHCR, 2024). Together, these factors make continued residence in Myanmar untenable for many, pushing them to seek refuge in neighboring countries.

3.2 Pull Factors to Thailand: Safety, Proximity, and a Sense of Home

In contrast, Thailand offers a combination of practical, emotional, and cultural pull factors that make it the most accessible and desirable destination for many fleeing Myanmar. Geographically, Thailand shares a porous border with Myanmar, allowing both regular and irregular crossings, especially through border towns like Mae Sot and Mae Sai. This proximity enables easier movement compared to other countries in the region (Lindquist, 2010). Thailand also provides relative safety and political stability. While migrants may still face legal uncertainty and discrimination, the risks are considerably lower than in Myanmar. Importantly, migrants can access basic needs—such as food, shelter, informal healthcare, and legal registration—more reliably in Thailand. The Pink Card system, despite its limitations, offers a pathway for temporary legal status, allowing migrants to work and avoid deportation (Piper, 2017). Culturally, many Myanmar migrants find it easier to adapt to life in Thailand due to shared Theravada Buddhist traditions, linguistic similarities, and familial or community ties in Thai border provinces. Some migrants even describe living in places like Chiang Mai and Mae Sot as “feeling like home.” This emotional familiarity plays a significant role in easing the trauma of displacement and rebuilding a sense of belonging in exile. As Ambrosini (2017) notes, migrant decision-making often balances not only economic logic but also social and emotional rationalities, especially for those fleeing conflict.

4.     Thematic Analysis of Interview Findings

The following section draws on field interviews conducted in April and May 2025 in Mae Sot, Mae Kasa, Chiang Mai, and Mae Wang with Myanmar migrants currently living in Thailand. The findings show that Thailand’s biometric registration and Pink Card system often does not align with migrants’ real situations. Instead of providing protection and stability, the system can create new forms of insecurity and exclusion. Six main themes emerged from the interviews.

4.1 Limited Legal Categories Do Not Reflect Migrants’ Lives

Thailand’s Pink Card system is officially designed for migrant workers in low-skilled sectors such as construction, agriculture, domestic work, and fisheries. However, this narrow legal framework does not reflect the diverse realities of migrants’ lives, especially those with educational aspirations, professional backgrounds, or remote work skills.

Several interviewees expressed that the Pink Card system limits their freedom to study or work in jobs outside of manual labor or domestic work. For example, one migrant, who holds a Pink Card, shared that “He wants to join a digital arts school in Thailand but is unable to do so due to lack of income, and can’t find a proper job because of Pink Card restrictions”. Another case involved a “migrant who was working with a laptop at a café. The police questioned him, assuming he should be working in a factory, and called his registered employer. The next day, the employer canceled his status, and he became undocumented.”

These stories show how migrants who work in non-traditional sectors—such as digital freelance work, creative industries, or education—face legal and social barriers because the Pink Card system only recognizes a narrow range of occupations. This mismatch can cause migrants to lose their legal status, even when they are working honestly and contributing to society. This reflects the concept of legal precarity where state-defined legal categories do not match migrants’ lived realities (Khosravi, 2010). Migrants are forced into rigid occupational categories that exclude freelance or digital labor, creating legal vulnerabilities even for those working transparently.

4.2 High Costs and Reliance on Brokers

Some migrants manage to obtain Pink Cards more easily because they can pay brokers to handle the process. One interviewee paid 25,000 baht to a broker who arranged everything, including finding a fake employer. The broker received fees for arranging employment documents, and the fake employer reportedly received 2,000–3,000 baht per person.

This case highlights how migrants without knowledge of the system or legal assistance are often forced to rely on brokers. While brokers can make the process faster, they also charge high fees and operate in grey areas, sometimes using fake documents or illegal arrangements. The cost of legal status is often unaffordable for low-income migrants, making them more vulnerable to being undocumented or exploited. These findings align with Lindquist and Xiang’s (2014) argument that when legal pathways are complex or inaccessible, brokers emerge as crucial—and costly—migration intermediaries who thrive in legal grey zones.

 4.3 Migrants Fleeing Conflict Are Not Recognized as Refugees

Some interviewees were former professionals—such as doctor and university teacher—who fled Myanmar after joining the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). They crossed the border irregularly to escape arrest and persecution. Now in Thailand, they have registered as general laborers under the Pink Card system, even though their backgrounds and reasons for leaving Myanmar are political.

These individuals do not fit into the labor migrant category, but Thailand does not officially recognize them as refugees. As a result, they cannot apply for asylum and must accept lower-status jobs just to stay legal. This leads to downward mobility and feelings of insecurity and loss of identity.

4.4 Legal Status Offers Temporary Safety, But Not Long-Term Stability

Despite the problems, some migrants view the Pink Card as the best option available. One man said that even though his education visa expired, he registered for a Pink Card instead of returning to Myanmar, where he feared being conscripted or caught in civil conflict. For him, legal status in Thailand—even as a manual laborer—is better than living in fear and insecurity in Myanmar.

However, this also shows that migrants are often forced to accept legal categories that do not match their qualifications or plans. The current system provides short-term safety but blocks people from improving their situation or accessing better opportunities.

5.     The Pink Card: A Critical Analysis of Its Limitations for Refugee Labor

The Pink Card system, while serving as Thailand’s primary legal framework for registering migrant workers from neighboring countries, fundamentally falls short in addressing the complex realities of Myanmar migrants—especially those fleeing political persecution and armed conflict. Although it offers a formal legal status, the system rigidly categorizes migrants into predefined labor sectors, primarily manual or traditional jobs such as construction, agriculture, and domestic work. This narrow categorization does not reflect the diverse backgrounds, skills, and urgent protection needs of many Myanmar migrants, particularly political refugees and professionals displaced by the 2021 military coup.

Interviews reveal that many migrants who fled Myanmar for reasons of political persecution—such as former university teachers and medical doctors—are forced to register under the Pink Card’s traditional labor categories. This misclassification denies them recognition of their professional qualifications and undermines their ability to secure employment aligned with their skills. Consequently, they experience downward social mobility, underemployment, and a loss of professional identity, effectively becoming “refugee labor” trapped in a labor market designed for low-skilled migrants.

Moreover, the Pink Card system does not provide adequate protection or pathways for asylum or refugee status. Thailand’s non-signatory status to the 1951 Refugee Convention means that political refugees must rely on this labor migrant registration system as their only legal avenue for residence. The lack of a formal refugee status framework forces these individuals into uncertain legal categories that do not fit their circumstances, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation, limited labor rights, and arbitrary visa cancellations tied to employer sponsorship (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

The system’s heavy reliance on employer sponsorship creates further insecurity. Migrants’ legal status—and thus their right to stay—depends on employers who may withdraw support for various reasons, including misunderstanding or exploitation. As documented in the interviews, employer revocation of sponsorship can instantly render migrants undocumented, exposing them to police harassment, detention, or forced labor. This structural vulnerability highlights how the Pink Card system enforces a power imbalance that disproportionately affects refugee laborers who already face social and legal marginalization.

In sum, the Pink Card only gives limited and temporary legal status, and it doesn’t fit the real needs of Myanmar people who are fleeing political problems. Its restrictive categories, absence of refugee recognition, and employer dependency reproduce patterns of exclusion and precariousness, undermining migrants’ dignity, and security. This critique aligns with the scholar emphasizing how migrant registration systems often reflect state interests in controlling labor mobility rather than protecting migrants’ rights or humanitarian needs.

Policy Recommendations
Recommendation 1: Create a Skilled Refugee Labor Pathway

Thailand should introduce a formal pathway that recognizes and utilizes the skills of refugee and forced migrants who possess professional backgrounds, academic credentials, or specialized work experience. Many individuals fleeing Myanmar after the 2021 coup—such as doctors, university lecturers, engineers, and IT professionals—are currently registered under low-skill labor categories due to the limitations of the Pink Card system. This not only wastes valuable human capital but also restricts their ability to contribute meaningfully to Thai society and the economy.

To address this gap, Thailand could develop a new legal classification, such as a “Skilled Humanitarian Worker Permit,” specifically for refugees and displaced persons with verifiable credentials. Eligibility could be based on prior professional employment, educational attainment, or documented affiliation with persecuted groups. The policy should be co-designed in collaboration with key stakeholders like the UNHCR, ILO, civil society groups, and academic institutions.

As a starting point, the Thai government could launch a pilot program in high-need areas such as Chiang Mai or Mae Sot, where there are already significant populations of skilled migrants. In partnership with local NGOs and labor offices, the pilot could test the process and refine selection criteria. To facilitate implementation, a centralized registry or digital platform should be created where migrants can upload their credentials, work histories, and skill profiles. This system can then match qualified individuals with job openings in sectors such as education, caregiving, healthcare, and digital services. Support services such as legal counseling and language training should be offered to improve placement outcomes.

In the longer term, labor and immigration laws should be updated to legally recognize this skilled refugee category and provide safeguards for those who crossed into Thailand irregularly but meet professional standards. Periodic reviews and monitoring should guide the gradual expansion of the program nationwide.

Thailand can draw inspiration from international models. The first one is Canada’s Economic Mobility Pathways Pilot (EMPP) which helps skilled refugees move to Canada not just as asylum seekers, but through economic immigration pathways—such as jobs in healthcare, trades, or IT. It recognizes that some refugees have the skills and experience to fill labor shortages and supports them in moving legally and safely. Secondly, Italy’s University Corridors for Refugees (UNICORE) offer refugees a chance to continue their higher education in Italy. It offers scholarships, visas, and university placements to refugees already in countries like Ethiopia or Kenya. This model shows how education can be used as a safe and structured pathway for migration. Both integrate skilled refugees into national labor markets and education. By following these examples, Thailand can move toward a more inclusive migration policy that addresses humanitarian needs while also filling labor gaps and boosting its own development.

Recommendation 2: Introduce a Training Visa Scheme for Refugees and Migrant Professionals – Inspired by Germany

To better integrate displaced persons and skilled migrant workers into Thailand’s labor force, the Thai government should develop a Training Visa scheme that combines legal residence, sector-specific training, and job-matching services. This visa would offer vocational and language preparation to individuals with prior professional experience—especially from Myanmar—who are currently excluded from formal employment due to certification gaps, legal status, or language barriers.

Additionally, Thailand can take inspiration from Germany’s Skilled Immigration Act, which opens legal pathways for vocationally trained workers through simplified visa processes and a points-based “Opportunity Card.” A Thai adaptation could prioritize applicants with relevant education or experience and provide a transition path into formal work permits after completing the training.

This program should be developed through collaboration between the Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Interior, and implemented through partnerships with Thai universities and vocational institutions (e.g., Chiang Mai University, Mahidol University). These institutions could offer short-term training programs, including Thai language instruction, Labor rights awareness, and Vocational modules aligned with Thai labor market needs.

Pilot projects could start in areas with high migrant populations, such as Chiang Mai, Mae Sot, and Bangkok. To ensure accessibility, the Thai government can partner with UNHCR, ILO, and NGOs to offer financial support, housing, and legal aid for vulnerable participants. A cross-sector task force should oversee the scheme to maintain quality, monitor labor rights, and ensure alignment with economic demand.

Conclusion

Thailand’s Pink Card system, while providing temporary legal status to many migrants, fundamentally misrepresents and misclassifies a significant portion of the post-2021 Myanmar migration population. These individuals are not merely labor migrants seeking better wages, but survival migrants-fleeing political persecution, violent conflict, and state collapse. The system’s rigid labor-based framework fails to accommodate their complex realities, forcing skilled professionals, students, and political activists into low-status roles with few rights and high risks of exploitation.

Field interviews reveal that while migrants value the relative safety Thailand offers, they are constrained by structural limitations, including restrictive occupational categories, reliance on costly brokers, and employer-dependent legal status. These challenges highlight how the Pink Card system, rather than offering protection, often reinforces insecurity and exclusion.

To respond to the evolving nature of Myanmar’s displacement crisis, Thailand must rethink its migrant registration policies. A more inclusive system-one that introduces pathways for skilled refugee labor and expands legal classifications-would not only enhance human rights protections but also harness the potential contributions of a displaced population. Migrants are not a homogeneous labor force; they are teachers, students, artists, parents, and change-makers. Recognizing this diversity is crucial for developing policies rooted in dignity, equity, and sustainable regional resilience.

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